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A B S T R A C T 
The central aim of this paper is to argue that sex is an important area of study for philosophers, and that the present vitality of the philosophy of sex 
stems largely from the contributions of feminist thinkers. "Sex" refers to three distinct areas: gender sex, erotic sex, and sexual politics. In all these areas, 
prejudice and habit create difficulties in discussing sex; underlying those prejudices are some traditional models of the person in which sexuality 
threatens the real self. Feminist philosophy of sexuality involves critiques of those models, and of various forms of gender with them. 
R E S U M E 
Le but principal de cet expose est de fa ire valoir 1'importance pour les philosophes, des problemes de la philosophie de la sexualite, et parliculierement 
de la pensee feministe en ce domaine. "Sexualite" designe trois domaines distincts: la division des sexes, l'eroiisme, et les aspects politiques. Dans les 
trois domaines, les prejuges rendent difficiles la pensee aussi bien que le discours. Derriere ces prejuges, il y a des conceptions traditionnelles de la 
personnequi opposent la sexualite et le moi authentique. La philosophie feministe de la sexualite fait la critique de tels modeles, ainsi quede plusieurs 
formes d'essentialisme qui s'y rattachent. 
T h e view prevails i n the E n g l i s h language p h i l o s o p h i -
cal c o m m u n i t y that sex is a marginal subject, a suspi-
ciously bent twig off a branch of social phi losophy. O u r 
a i m is to persuade you that sex is an important, excit ing 
area of study for philosophers. We shall also argue more 
specifically that the present vital i ty of the phi losophy of 
sex stems largely f rom the contributions of feminist 
thinkers. 1 
Three Senses of Sex 
It might seem that questions about sex are straightfor-
wardly b io logica l . As we shal l see, it is not very clear what 
it is for a question to be "merely b i o l o g i c a l . " Even o n the 
biological level, the issues are controversial. 2 
T h e word "sex," i n fact, encompasses three different 
areas. We cal l these gender sex, erotic sex, and sexual 
polit ics. A l l three terms require a gloss. 
(i) Gender Sex 
Gender sex refers to feminine and masculine, female 
and male. These are two different distinctions, and we 
shal l introduce an appropriate refinement of the termi-
nology. Both distinctions are merged when we speak of 
the sexes, the opposite sex, or the war of the sexes. Three 
questions arise about gender sex. What exactly differen-
tiates the sexes? H o w many are there? H o w and to what 
extent does sex affect gender? 
T h e b io logica l aspect of sex refer to maleness and 
femaleness: gametes, chromosomes, the anatomy and 
functions of internal and external reproductive organs. It 
also refers, at least prima facie, to certain h o r m o n a l differ-
ences and to secondary sex characteristics. Gender, by 
contrast, refers to the normative psychological constructs 
of feminini ty and masculinity. It embraces sex roles 
played out i n a social context and typically includes cultur-
a l ly variable features such as style, language, and dress. 
T h e term "sexual d i m o r p h i s m " is used of both gender and 
sex. It should not be assumed as a matter of def in i t ion , 
however, that there are just two genders or sexes (see 
M o r g a n , 1979). T h o u g h usual ly ascribed at bir th o n the 
basis of biological sex, gender does not appear to be deter-
m i n e d by sex. Were the case otherwise, our (normative) 
descriptions of "mascul ine w o m e n " and " feminine m e n " 
w o u l d be pointless. Feminist thinkers have stressed that 
the def in ing features of gender are ideological , and are 
coercively enforced by i n d i v i d u a l men and institutions i n 
patriarchal (i.e., practically all) societies. 
(ii) Erotic Sex 
T h e second area of sex, erotic sex, includes sexual expe-
rience, sexual behaviour, and sexual relation. What makes 
an experience, a mode of behaviour, or a relationship 
sexual? We shall make no attempt to define erotic sex here; 
but, by trying to formulate some universally va l id criter-
i o n , the reader can easily see that the erotic is, indeed, as 
diff icult to define as any other (Wittgensteinian) game. 
Consider two scenarios. In one, a woman is manipulat -
i n g the vagina of another w o m a n rec l in ing o n a couch. In 
the other, a m a n is watch ing other men play football . 
W h i c h scenario is sexual? Is the first not obviously so? A d d 
that the w o m a n i n the first scenario is a gynecologist 
e x a m i n i n g a patient, whi le the m a n i n the second is enjoy-
i n g detailed sexual fantasies about the players w h o m he is 
watching (see S m i t h , 1980). What if we add that the gyne-
cologist is also the patient's lover; and the whole scene is 
on a movie set? What if it is part of a pornographic movie 
being filmed? O u r answers w i l l , i n part, depend—to an 
extent that w i l l vary f rom one culture to another—on 
questions of gender. As knowledge about context increases, 
our judgement of whether some behaviour is sexual may 
f l ip - f lop (see Solomon, 1975). 
If we do make bold to define erotic sex, we have a 
methodological choice. One opt ion is to give a m i n i m a l or 
spare def ini t ion of erotic sex, and then examine separately 
questions about the relation of eros i n that m i n i m a l sense 
to other emotional , psychological , social, and pol i t i ca l 
issues. A r i ch def in i t ion , by contrast, w i l l lay d o w n 
answers to those related questions as part of the essence of 
real sex. 
A l a n G o l d m a n (1977) argued for the first opt ion, where-
i n p l a i n , normal erotic sex is defined i n terms of contact 
w i t h the body of another to produce pleasure i n oneself. 
Such a def ini t ion raises many questions. Is skin contact 
really necessary? Is physical arousal either necessary or 
sufficient? Does the def in i t ion countenance dead bodies (a 
theme dear to many a classic fairy tale featuring dead or 
comatose women) as the object of erotic interest? 
A r ich def in i t ion w i l l tend to settle such questions, but 
not wi thout begging a lot of questions about the concepts 
of perversion, subl imat ion, repression, l iberation, and 
normal i ty . T h e most elaborate r ich def ini t ion of sex, and 
also the most inf luent ia l , is the reproductive model articu-
lated by A q u i n a s (1967). In A q u i n a s ' view, the f o l l o w i n g 
c la ims are a l l integrally related: the emission of semen has 
the natural funct ion of causing reproduction; a l l sexuality 
activity ought to be potential ly reproductive; and, mar-
riage must last forever and w o m e n must be subject to men. 
(Hi) Sexual Politics 
T h e th ird area is the one that has received the greatest 
amount of attention from mora l and pol i t ica l phi los-
ophers. P h i l o s o p h i c a l journals , as wel l as popular maga-
zines, have lately presented a plethora of articles on such 
questions as sexual objectification, the ethics and polit ics 
of discr iminat ion and affirmative action, reproductive 
rights such as abortion and surrogate motherhood, and 
the right to sex education in l ight of A I D S . There are also 
po l i t i ca l issues about erotic sex and, of course, the more 
famil iar territory of sexual morality. T y p i c a l l y these are 
issues about freedom of sexual choice. These, too, some-
times depend on gender. In Canadian law, for instance, a 
male of 14 years or more may have sexual relations w i t h a 
partner of 14 years, unless the partner is male, i n w h i c h 
case they must wait unt i l both are 21 (see the Canadian 
Criminal Code, sections 140, 146, and 158). 
Questions about the morality and the politics of sex are 
usually considered i n isolation from issues about gender 
and erotic sex. Yet, they often presuppose unexamined 
answers to the latter questions. One example concerns the 
difference between the private and the publ ic . One might 
at first think that questions about gender sex belong to the 
p u b l i c sphere, whi le erotic sex belongs to the private. 
Feminists have drawn attention to the extent to w h i c h 
p u b l i c ideology permeates allegedly private experience. 
T h i s occurs most obviously through established institu-
tions such as marriage, i n c l u d i n g the permissibil i ty of 
marital rape (which was made i l legal i n Canada only i n 
1983 and is st i l l legal i n many U.S . states), but partly also 
through the quasi- institutionalization of compulsory 
heterosexuality i n the form of differential access to p r i v i -
lege. C i v i l , social, and economic security-inheritance, 
pension plans, " f a m i l y " health plans, adoption, job secur-
ity, lodging, i m m i g r a t i o n — a l l are affected by "pr ivate" 
sexual orientation. 3 Even explicit h u m a n rights legisla-
t ion can leave these privilege intact: the Province of Onta-
rio , for example, recently passed legislation against dis-
c r i m i n a t i o n on grounds of sexual orientation; yet, pro-
vincia l health care family benefits continue to be restricted 
to heterosexuals. 
Few questions about sexual justice, about the institu-
t ional izat ion of gender sex and of erotic sex, or about the 
private and publ ic relations between the sexes can be 
adequately answered without reference to theories about 
the nature of sexual differences, sexual experience, and 
sexual relations. Sociopolit ical proposals, conservative or 
radical , inevitably come w i t h theoretical presuppositions 
about the essence of sex i n both of its primary senses. It is, 
therefore, curious, if not a little scandalous that philos-
ophers have devoted so little energy so far to those appar-
ently more fundamental questions. 
Talking About Sex 
In both of its primary senses, but for different reasons, 
sex is hard to think about. Gender sex, though easy to 
describe, is diff icult to focus on as the object of phi lo -
sophical i n q u i r y because social practice often appears to 
have a certain obvious naturalness about it, particularly 
for those i n a pos i t ion of power. Erotic experience is 
dif f icult both to think and to talk about. T h i s is, to begin 
w i t h , because of the embarrassment that many people feel, 
part icularly w i t h their o w n experience. T h e elaborate and 
uninhib i ted vocabulary available to describe oral plea-
sures forms an instructive contrast here. In the gastronom-
ical equivalents of orgies, the flavours, aroma, colour, 
texture, and arrangement of food are celebrated openly 
around the tables of p u b l i c restaurants. Starving, feeling 
hungry, experiencing appetite, and a zest to eat can a l l be 
expressed without reserve. T h e pornography of cook-
books is neither censored nor prosecuted; cookware bou-
tiques exist to enhance our pleasure, and people are not 
ashamed to be seen f o n d l i n g the objects displayed i n them 
as they relate their fantasies. T h e discrepancy demands 
analysis. 
One obvious cause of the difficulties in t h i n k i n g and 
ta lk ing about erotic sex is that we almost entirely lack a 
useful vocabulary i n w h i c h to speak of erotic sex. Some 
words are rated " v u l g a r " or unprintable; others are strictly 
medical i n connotation; and sti l l others are euphemisms 
r e q u i r i n g hearers to assume what they do not say. A l l tend 
to come w i t h implicat ions that a philosopher should 
challenge. 4 
Three qu ick examples. The most c o m m o n group of 
unprintable words referring to sexual activity—fuck, 
screw, bang, and many others—all carry, i n their very 
syntax, the i m p l i c a t i o n of activity on the part of the male 
and passivity o n the part of the female (see Baker, 1984). 
T h e very language rules governing this descriptive vocab-
ulary entail male dominance. 
For a second example, consider the terms used most 
often by men to refer to women. Such terms may represent 
w o m e n as various kinds or parts of animals (e.g., chick, 
b i rd , fox, pussy, tai l , piece of ass, cow); as playthings (e.g., 
babe, dol l ) ; as fetishised body parts (e.g., cunt, pussy, 
piece); as frivolous edible products (e.g., sugar, honey, 
cupcake, cookie, crumpet, dish, peach, cherry, and tart). 5 
T h i r d , given a l l this, it is not surpris ing that our most 
c o m m o n euphemism for erotic sexual activity is also 
"gender-corrupted." "Intercourse"" is a f ine word on the 
road to swift degradation, not because of its use i n a sexual 
context, but because of its systematic and now a l l but 
unavoidable misuse i n that context. Properly used, any 
erotic mode of relating—whether heterosexual, gay or 
lesbian, and i n c l u d i n g not only the genital but also the 
ocular, the oscular, and even the merely jocular—ought to 
count as "sexual intercourse." The literal meaning of the 
phrase fits it to be used as one of the widest and vaguest 
terms available to describe erotic interaction. In current 
usage, sexual intercourse is very precisely Penile Intromis-
s ion into the V a g i n a w i t h M a l e Orgasm (or P I V M O , as a 
logical ly correct sexual discourse might have it). We need 
to struggle to become aware of the moral and pol i t ica l 
impl icat ions of our sexual vocabulary. 
Models of the Person 
We now turn to the very general questions of how erotic 
sex fits into our conception of the h u m a n person. Broadly 
speaking, there are three competing models. 
(i) The Pythagorean or Orthodox Polar Model 
W i t h i n this model , we are composed of a material and a 
spir i tual part. A l l appetites belong to the material part, 
and erotic sex is an appetite. T h i s is merely a structural 
description, but of course its power comes from its relative 
evaluation of the various parts. Accord ing to the orthodox 
version, the material part is lower, the spir i tual is higher. 
It is cruc ia l to understand h o w such models affect the 
way we think and feel about h u m a n sexuality. T h e Polar 
M o d e l clearly consigns sex to the category of an a n i m a l 
appetite. For example, Jean-Paul Sartre argues that we 
experience sexual desire as the invasion and c l o u d i n g of 
consciousness by the body (see Sartre, 1956, especially III 2 
and 3). S imi lar ly , A l a n G o l d m a n (1977) claims that our 
experience of sexual desire reminds us that we are animals. 
Sexual desire is seen as inferior, but as hav ing the power to 
subjugate intellectual and moral funct ion. Carr ied to the 
extreme, it becomes the deadly sin of lust, or the female-
specific personality disorder of n y m p h o m a n i a . T h u s , 
a long w i t h other bodily experiences, sexuality becomes a 
v ic t im of the general attitude of somatophobia (see Spel-
man, 1982, 1983). It is feared, derogated, and suppressed. 
(ii) The Lawrentian or Inverted Puritanical Model 
T h e evaluative element can be logical ly separated from 
the structural one, so we might expect sometimes to 
encounter a s imple invers ion of the evaluation that pre-
serves the essential structure. Just as the mainstream view 
leads to the derogation of sex, so the inverted view leads to 
its exaltation i n sexual l iber t in ism. De Sade, W . R e i c h , 
Wal t W h i t m a n and D . H . Lawrence are perhaps examples 
of writers w h o took the view that the person is indeed dual , 
but that of our two parts, the real, the higher self is that 
expressed ineros. 
T h e mainstream view as wel l as its L a w r e n t i a n inver-
s ion m i g h t be dubbed pur i tanica l views. P u r i t a n i s m i n 
this sense is not the c l a i m that sex is bad. It is the more 
abstract view that the value of an actor or state of m i n d is to 
be gauged i n terms not of their consequences, but of their 
or igins . If an act of state of m i n d has its o r i g i n i n the best 
or most real part of the self, it is " p u r e , " otherwise it is 
po l lu ted . Y o u might th ink that the rat ional part of the 
soul is the good or authentic one, or you might assign that 
place to the inst inctual and sexual alone. T o be moral ly 
pure is to fo l low the higher agency whichever that 
happens to be. T h u s , there can be puritans of sex as wel l as 
(the more common) puritans of antisex. 
(Hi) The Pansexual Model 
T h e th ird model is the descendant of a view expressed i n 
Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium. It roughly amounts to 
the thesis that erotic sex and phi losophy are one and the 
same th ing , because erotic sex is at the core of a l l motiva-
t ion i n the person as a whole. (Freud might also be classed 
as espousing this model.) In this third view, there is no 
necessary polarity between differently evaluated parts of 
the person. Different activities and impulses can, of 
course, be judged variously good, but the model of the 
person involved does not automatical ly assign an evalua-
t ion to every act on puri tanical grounds i n our technical 
sense. 
H o w are erotic sex and gender sex related? In the main-
stream view, they are assumed to be two aspects of the same 
t h i n g . 6 T h e rationale for this posi t ion is something l ike 
this. Once you understand that there are two sexes, then it 
stands to reason that sexual attraction is the result of the 
natural difference between them—whether defined as 
complementarity, polarity, or pr ivat ion. Conversely, there 
w o u l d be no need for a systematic difference between the 
sexes if it were not for the b io logica l or perhaps metaphys-
ical requirements of sexual attraction. T h i s heterosexist 
assumption seems to be widely taken for granted (see 
Marabel Morgan, 1973; Scruton, 1986). 
In keeping w i t h our preference for lean definit ions over 
r i ch ones, we shall take it, w i t h Plato, that the two aspects 
of sex are indeed conceptually independent. T h i s w o u l d 
enable us to look cr i t ical ly at what relations are to be 
f o u n d between the two, without assuming that no such 
enquiry can succeed unless it is blessed w i t h analyticity. 
But What is Philosophic? 
Since the above questions and speculations are i n t u i -
tively phi losophica l , it is curious that they have a l l been 
almost totally ignored by philosophers. Even now, prop-
onents of courses i n the phi losophy of sex encounter con-
siderable resistance w i t h i n the phi losophical communi ty . 
T h e prevai l ing attitude is: this is not really phi losophy. Is 
it plausible that a subject that plays such an overwhelm-
ingly important role i n our lives should turn out to be 
unworthy of phi losophica l interest? In its various guises, 
sex affects our laws, our po l i t i ca l and economic life, the 
patterns of violence prevalent i n a given culture, the 
degree of access of individuals to the publ ic d o m a i n , and 
opportunit ies for sport and physical development. It per-
meates our consciousness of ourselves, our gestures, our 
fantasies, our notions of mental health and beauty, and, of 
course, our art. H o w m u c h w o u l d be left of Shakespeare if 
we truly censored a l l those aspects of plots, passion or 
springs of character that can be referred directly to sexual-
ity i n any of the three senses we have distinguished? W i t h -
out erotic sex, some plays—Othello, Romeo and Juliet, 
The Taming of the Shrew—would make no sense at a l l . 
T o remove reference to gender sex, we should have to 
eliminate from the comedies a l l those plot devices that rely 
on the business of cross dressing. We w o u l d also probably 
have to question much of the motivation i n those more 
mil i tary tragedies and histories, where manliness is a l l . 
Perhaps the extraordinary denial of the phi losophica l 
relevance of sex is motivated by an unexamined p h i l o -
sophical prejudice i n favour of the view that sex is just an 
appetite; or perhaps there is a different assumption that 
w o u l d justify it. Whatever that assumption could be, it 
must involve a thesis about the nature of sex and its place 
i n h u m a n life. T h e rejection of sex as a phi losophica l 
topic is itself jus tan unsupported thesis in the phi losophy 
of sex. T h i s rejection, therefore, lacks credibility on two 
counts: it is self-refuting, and at its core there is merely the 
refusal of argument—but is this not the cardinal p h i l o -
sophical sin? 
T h e claims we have just made presume some intuitive 
not ion of what phi losophy is. They call for justif ication, 
or at least expl icat ion. So let us backtrack a moment for a 
dogmatic compression on the theme: what is philosophy? 
One def in ing feature of phi losophy that it aims at 
insight through argument. As i n science, the emphasis on 
argument is important for what it excludes: there are no 
sacred texts, no prophets, no privileged revelations, i n 
short, no authorities. That is what makes phi losophy 
essentially subversive and democratic. What is the relevant 
sense of argument involved here? 
Three Ways to Insight Through Talk 
In one sense it s imply involves the acquisi t ion of belief 
i n a proposi t ion that appears as the bottom line of an 
inductive or deductive argument. Usual ly a mere change 
i n belief of this order lacks the visionary quali ty that is 
connoted by the word " i n s i g h t . " T h e second way is typical 
of communicat ion about aesthetic matters (see Isenberg, 
1949): it consists i n directing someone's attention. That 
can be done by point ing , or by a combinat ion of p o i n t i n g 
and describing, but i n the end insight must come from just 
seeing what is there to see. T h e sudden gestalting of some-
th ing not seen before is part of what gives visual arts their 
special magic, and on a metaphorical plane it is also 
something to w h i c h phi losophy at its best aspires. 
Cr i t ica l communicat ion , however, is not strictly speak-
i n g argument. So, how can phi losophy manage the anal-
ogous trick on the basis of real argument? One answer is 
that when enough beliefs change, and change radically 
enough, " v i s i o n " fol lows. That is true; but, there is also 
another answer, appeal ing to a method w h i c h is a hybrid 
of the other two. It draws attention to facts w h i c h have 
passed unnoticed, and then inferr ing to the best explana-
tion of what seems at first sight inexplicable about those 
facts. By this method i t is sometimes possible to see what 
was invisible though it was, i n a sense, always i n f u l l view. 
W h e n properly appl ied, this method w i l l hunt out 
those premises that lie deepest i n a philosopher's concep-
tual edifice: the unexpressed assumptions, the unargued 
presuppositions. What must Berkeley have assumed, to 
f ind it so obvious that noth ing is ever immediately present 
to the sense but ideas? Those sorts of questions are the 
hardest to answer, because the deepest assumptions are 
often shared between those w h o think they h o l d opposite 
views. They are also, for the same reason, the most reveal-
ing , the most l ikely to yield that l iberating novelty of 
vision w h i c h we have suggested is a central ideal of phi los-
ophy (see Russell , 1959, p p . 153-161). 
What is this, if not consciousness-raising? Speaking i n 
the context of the Women's Movement, Joan Cassell 
(1977, quoted i n Spender, 1980, p. 130) describes the pro-
cess of consciousness-raising as a subjective state w h i c h 
can refer to "becoming conscious of something w h i c h one 
d id not formerly perceive, of ra is ing something from the 
unconscious to the conscious m i n d , to heightened con-
sciousness of oneself or a state of affairs." T h i s process of 
realization does not result i n piecemeal shifts i n percep-
tion, but involves a transformation wherein the indiv idual 
"switches w o r l d s . " T h a t is a pretty fair characterization of 
phi losophy itself (Compare Wittgenstein, 1953, sec. 144: 
"I have changed his way of l o o k i n g at things."). 
Let us look at this method at work i n a relatively modest 
context. If you c la im to be or know a liberated feminist 
family man, try this innocent question: D o you help w i t h 
the housework and babysit the children? Yes, of course. Is 
he not a liberated feminist man? T h a t sounds plausible 
enough, for a moment. T h e n ask yourself whether you 
w o u l d have asked the same question of a married mother. 
W o u l d you expect her to reply, "Yes, of course I help w i t h 
the housework and babysit!"? T h e question and the 
answer now have a completely different r i n g , for the terms 
" h e l p i n g " or "babys i t t ing" i m p l y an auxi l iary role, by 
someone whose real responsibility is elsewhere. Often the 
deepest (patriarchal) attitudes are revealed i n the presup-
positions of an innocent phrase. 
A s imilar example serves to reveal the depth as wel l as 
the invis ib i l i ty of heterosexist attitudes. There are liberals 
w h o th ink themselves creditably tolerant of homosexual-
ity, but at the same time insist that it should not be 
flaunted. Is not sex a private matter, and is it not, therefore, 
out of place to advertize your sexual preferences? Let us 
address the heterosexual reader: does this not sound 
entirely reasonable? Yes, u n t i l we draw your attention to 
the fact that heterosexuals are always out of the closet. C a n 
you imagine locker rooms and faculty clubs, dinner par-
ties and office gossip, where etiquette required that no one 
ever mention engagement rings, husbands, wives, " g i r l - " 
or "boyfr iends , " at least not i n such a way as ever to reveal 
the preferred gender of their real or imagined sexual 
partner? T h e w o r l d in w h i c h the homosexual is asked to 
keep her sexual orientation to herself, is a w o r l d where the 
majority make of theirs a constant exhib i t ion . They fl irt , 
h o l d hands, kiss each other goodbye i n publ i c , embrace, 
and so on . More significantly, where access to privilege, 
economic benefit, c i v i l rights, job security, and historical 
legitimacy are granted on the publ i c display of heterosex-
ual a f f i l ia t ion , there is m u c h to be gained through such 
heterosexual f launt ing. What does the inference to the best 
explanat ion suggest there? Clearly, that the so-called l ib-
eral s t i l l acts as if any but the heterosexual choice violated 
a n o r m of nature. A concept of erotic sex as purely private 
fails to account for the ways i n w h i c h heterosexuality is 
intensely publ ic . 
Sandra Bartky (1979, p p . 252-258) has suggested that the 
term "feminist phenomenology" for examples such as the 
foregoing. Phenomenology is, here as elsewhere, only a 
beginning. F e m i n i s m can make at least two addit ional 
contributions to phi losophy. First, it offers a point of view 
from w h i c h far-reaching cr i t ic ism of other disciplines can 
be undertaken, both o n the metholodogical plane and i n 
the sphere of conceptual reconstruction; second, the use it 
makes of that interdisciplinary work casts new l ight o n 
some of the deepest and most ancient questions about 
h u m a n nature, i n c l u d i n g the significance of gender sex 
and the nature of erotic sex. 
Feminism as Philosophy of Sex 
Before we offer i l lustrat ions of this c l a i m , we must 
attend to a l ink st i l l miss ing i n our argument. W h y , it may 
be asked, have we been i m p l i c i t l y ident i fy ing feminism 
w i t h the ph i losophy of sex? W h y not speak s imply of 
ph i losophy of sex and its importance, leaving to fal l wher-
ever they may arguments for one thesis or another? 
It must be acknowledged that even a m i n i m a l def ini t ion 
of feminism, such as the f o l l o w i n g by Janet Radcliffe 
Richards (1982, p p . 13-14), refers expl ic i t ly to a thesis, not 
just a method or a topic, and is at least i m p l i c i t l y commit -
ted to a particular motivat ion: 
[Wjomen suffer f rom systematic social injustice 
because of their sex. ...I shal l be taking that proposi -
t ion as const i tut ing the essence of feminism, and 
count ing anyone w h o accepts it as a feminist. 
A feminist phi losopher is not merely someone w h o has 
become interested i n a conceptual analysis of sexism, sex-
ual injustice and other forms of gender-based oppression, 
though excellent conceptual analyses d o n o w exist (see, 
for example, A y i m and H o u s t o n , 1982; Frye, 1975). She or 
he is also committed to their eradication through p h i l o -
sophical cri t ique. Is not this, the pure phi losopher w i l l 
ask, just too parochial and too contaminated by practical 
goals to count as a phi losophy? W o u l d one not be better 
off characterizing the subject matter we are interested i n 
strictly i n terms of method or topic? 
O u r first reply is that the dist inct ion appealed to i n this 
objection is i l lusory. Thesis and method are often convert-
ible i n ph i losophy . M a n y of the great schools of phi los-
ophy can be characterized alternatively either i n terms of a 
central thesis or i n terms of a method or topic. T r y it for 
e m p i r i c i s m : the thesis is that a l l knowledge must be based 
o n experience; and the method follows. In existentialism 
the thesis is one about h u m a n nature as defined by con-
sciousness. That thesis generates an ethics and constrains 
phi losophica l method (the experimental method, for 
example, is more or less banned f rom psychology). It also 
l imi t s the topics that w i l l be of interest (there is not m u c h 
existentialist ph i losophy of mathematics). Analogously , 
consider how this works for a radical feminist whose 
central thesis is that "the personal is p o l i t i c a l . " Such a 
theorist w o u l d be committed to the phi losophica l methods 
best fitted to test that thesis: the conceptual analysis of 
concrete situations and alleged paradigm cases, and the 
phenomenological investigation of apparently private 
domains of subjectivity such as sexuality and love. There 
is no reason why feminism cannot legitimately belong to 
the tradition of schools of phi losophy that are defined 
partly by a thesis, partly by a characteristic set of methods, 
and partly by moral ends (see Jane Engl i sh , 1980). 
T h e second defense is that the existence of a normative 
motivat ion may actually provide a heuristic perspective 
that w i l l prove crit ically fertile. We shall see h o w this 
applies to feminist critiques of nonphi losophica l disci-
plines. Many feminist philosophers, moreover, question 
the other i m p l i c i t premise o n w h i c h the objection rests 
that there is a level of dispassionate phi losophica l interest, 
devoid of any motivation but curiosity, at w h i c h are to be 
found a thinker's best chances of objective discovery. We 
need to consider at least the possibility that the conceptual 
framework challenged by feminists runs so deep that it 
l iterally cannot be seen except through a conscientious 
effort to construe even apparently neutral phenonema as 
pervaded w i t h distortions induced by an ideology of male 
supremacy and heterosexism. (The form of this experience 
w i l l be famil iar to anyone who has undergone Freudian 
analysis.) 
Concrete il lustrations of this point are not hard to f ind . 
Generally, throughout Western thought and practice 
women have been regarded as less rational than men either 
because their intelligence is seen s imply as lesser i n degree 
or inferior i n k i n d ( L l o y d , 1984; M o r g a n , 1987). In turn, 
this c la im then justifies denying women f u l l participation 
i n forms of moral , social, pol i t i ca l , religious, and theoreti-
cal life. Sex research i n the empir ica l disciplines often 
seems directed toward this end. In historical perspective, 
the lengths to w h i c h science has gone to justify this sexist 
a x i o m is quite extraordinary. Nineteenth century brain 
researchers, for example, were anxious to prove that men 
were more intelligent than women. T h e method was to 
f i n d something—it d id not really matter what—that corre-
lated wi th intelligence, and of w h i c h women had less on 
the average than men. For example, it was at one time 
maintained that the seat of intelligence was i n the frontal 
lobes. As soon as it was found that frontal lobes d i d not 
tend to be smaller i n women, the very propounder of the 
o r i g i n a l thesis qu ick ly declared that we knew that in te l l i -
gence resides not i n the frontal but i n the parietal lobes (see 
Easley, 1981; Hubbard , 1982; also, L o n g i n o and Doel l , 
1983). 
T h i s illustrates one of the ident i fy ing characteristics of 
pseudo-science. Pseudo-science starts w i t h a conclusion 
and looks for any available method of establishing it. T h e 
difference from true science is relatively subtle here, 
because a l l science has to start w i t h some hypothesis to be 
tested (and sometimes the scientist earnestly hopes that it 
w i l l turn out to be true). A l l science must also make a great 
many auxi l iary assumptions, w h i c h normal ly remain 
unquestioned unless the investigation runs into trouble. 
However, scientists do not view the discovery of favoura-
ble evidence as their p r i n c i p a l task. For pseudo-science— 
for the aficionados of E S P or astrology—negative evidence 
s imply does not count. For the direction of progress has 
been defined ahead of time, so that evidence can only 
count as advancing the "science" if it confirms the pseudo-
science in that direction. 
T w o other identi fying features of pseudo-science are the 
crucial roles of the rush to explanation on the basis of 
imaginary evidence, and the positive-biased statistical 
i l l u s i o n . For example, much pointless intellectual energy 
is spent trying to expla in the powers of dowsers, or the 
disappearances of the Bermuda Tr iangle . The "explana-
t ions" are invariably fanciful ; but more important, the 
o r i g i n a l "factual observations" w h i c h one strives to 
expla in never occurred at a l l (see Giere, 1984, p. 378). In 
what passes for respected psychological research on sex 
differences, Paula C a p l a n has found many of the features 
of pseudo-science just listed (see C a p l a n , 1979, 1985; also 
Kinsbourne, 1980). 
Phi losophy itself is not immune to distortions of this 
sort. For an example, consider a w e l l - k n o w n paper by 
T o m N a g e l (1969), i n w h i c h Nage l is reluctant to 
acknowledge that no h i n t of perversion c o u l d attach to 
homosexuality, though that conclusion is clearly entailed 
by his theory (see M o u l t o n , 1969). 
In the rest of this paper we explore a specific feminist 
crit ique of erotic sex. We then conclude w i t h some 
remarks on the important implicat ions of recent feminist 
work on our conception of human nature. 
The Feminist Critique of Eros 
Beginning w i t h Simone de Beauvoir, contemporary 
feminists have produced powerful critiques of sex and 
love. 7 We shall consider just one example of a radical 
analysis of erotic sex i n the narrowest sense. 
Karen R o t k i n (1976) has argued as follows. When 
speaking of erotic sex, our use of language evinces a con-
cept of sexual activity that is exclusively based on hetero-
sexual male experience. We commonly ignore a straight-
forward factual difference between the male and female 
sexual and reproductive anatomies. T h e fact i n question is 
that the m a i n organ of sexual pleasure for the m a n is the 
same as the organ of reproduction, the penis. In women, 
the sex-equivalent of the penis is the clitoris (of w h i c h the 
penis is the homologous organ). 8 We are not now speak-
i n g of internal reproductive organs, such as testes, prostate 
and vas deferens, uterus, ovaries, and fa l lopian tube. None 
of these are relevant to reproductive behaviour. In terms of 
reproduction, and i n terms of typical male pleasure, Rot-
k i n argues, the vagina does seem to be the organ corres-
p o n d i n g to the penis. In point of anatomical fact as well as 
i n many women's experience, the vagina is of relatively 
little importance for a woman's sexual pleasure. (For 
further empir ica l support, see Hi te , 1976.) T h e contrary 
assumption, apart from its anatomical inaccuracy, entails 
a view of the very nature of heterosexual activity that is 
entirely male-centered. 
T h e resulting conception of erotic sex as consisting 
essentially of Penile Intromission Into T h e V a g i n a w i t h 
Male Orgasm defines i n c o l l o q u i a l , legal and medical 
usage the necessary and sufficient condit ions for the per-
formance of the act. In ordinary language " g o i n g a l l the 
w a y " means penis-vagina intercourse. S imilar ly , the quasi-
legal definitions of female virgini ty , marital consumma-
tion, adultery, and heterosexual rape are a l l conceptually 
focussed on penis-vagina intercourse. These l inguist ic 
practices, and omissions, support a phallocentric interpre-
tation of h u m a n sexuality w h i c h maintains that at least 
one erect penis (or pha l l i c substitute) is necessary for erotic 
sex to occur. In some historical periods, this phallocentric 
convic t ion has led to the theoretical denial of the possibi l -
ity of lesbians and lesbian eroticism (see Fry, 1983). T h e 
under ly ing prejudice infects the medical profession: the 
c l i toral silence i n gynecological textbooks and sex educa-
t ion materials deprives gir ls and women of the f u l l realiza-
t ion of woman-centered eroticism (Weiss, 1977; M o r g a n , 
1984). 
G i v e n the undeniable truth of Rotk in ' s basic observa-
tion, we f i n d persuasive her surmise that it might partly 
exp la in the most c o m m o n sexual "dysfunct ions" : those of 
impotent men and non-orgasmic women. It must be d i f f i -
cul t to be stimulated to orgasm if y o u happen to be m i s i n -
formed about the funct ion of the relevant organs. For a 
m a n it is, indeed, an awesome responsibil ity to have to 
assist i n an impossible task. (At least men had less trouble 
w h e n they were brought u p to believe that the question of 
sexual satisfaction is not one that could arise for a w o m a n 
at all.) 
T h e most i n t r i g u i n g i m p l i c a t i o n of Rotk in ' s observa-
tions, however, it that our entire culture has, i n effect, been 
b l i n d to b io logica l facts absolutely central to the nature of 
what passes for the paradigm of the natural side of h u m a n 
being, not the rituals of sex, not love, nor marriage, nor 
court ing, but the natural condit ions of sexual pleasure 
have been distorted by unexamined ideological assump-
tions. T h i s is an instance of what we might cal l androcent-
ric sol ipsism, the equation of male experience w i t h 
h u m a n experience (reflected i n the l inger ing practice and 
ardent defense of the use of the pseudo-generic p r o n o u n 
"he") . Such sol ipsism easily leads men to appropriate 
women's bodies w h i l e women are taught a complemen-
tary sexual ethic of erotic a l t ruism. ( T h i n k of a l l those 
sexual advice manuals w h i c h urge w o m e n to simulate 
orgasm.) (See Daly, 1974; D w o r k i n , 1978, especially chap-
ters 6 and 7.) 
Gender Essentialism 
Are we deal ing here s imply w i t h the prejudices of fa l l i -
ble i n d i v i d u a l men, philosophers, and scientists? In part, 
n o doubt this is so; but, there is more, and of deeper 
phi losophica l interest. It is not s imple malice, nor mere 
stupidity, that continues to distort so m u c h t h i n k i n g 
about sex into the shape of pseudo-science. M u c h of this 
distort ion can be traced to the deeply ingrained p h i l o -
sophical myth that there is an essence of maleness and 
mascul ini ty , and an essence of femaleness and feminini ty , 
there to be studied. T h i s is gender essentialism. 9 
T o see this, let us make a detour through the mysterious 
topic of gender identity. T h e p r o v o k i n g question here is, 
h o w do we know to what gender sex we properly belong? 
T h e possession of a certain genital configuration is 
neither necessary nor sufficient, as the case of transsexuals 
shows, for the acquis i t ion of a gender identity that fits 
one's outward anatomical sex. Other b io log ica l marks of 
sex such as gonadal sex, internal reproductive organs, or 
even chromosome configurat ion sometimes fai l to con-
verge; yet others, such as h o r m o n a l balance, are not dicho-
tomous but cont inuously variable. T h e one strictly dicho-
tomous characteristic, the abi l i ty to bear chi ldren, cou ld 
not be used as an actual def in ing criterion of femaleness 
without considerable gerrymandering. So what is sex-
gender identity? One of the most inf luent ia l theoretician 
i n the field has suggested that we acquire a sex identity i n 
the same way as we acquire a language. J o h n Money 
(Money and Tucker , 1975) posits a n innate capacity to 
acquire some gender identity or other, just as we have an 
innate l inguist ic capacity. T h a t innate capacity, l ike the 
analogous l inguist ic , leaves it entirely open w h i c h specific 
gender identity or language is actually learned. 
T h e paral le l is i n t r i g u i n g . What exactly is it that we 
learn? A y i m and H o u s t o n (1985) have shown that acquir-
i n g gender identity cannot consist i n inductive learning of 
the "core" characteristics of sex: menstruation, gestation, 
lactation, ejaculation, and impregnation. For gender 
identity generally becomes immutable somewhere between 
eighteen months and four years of age; that is too soon for 
such a sol id grasp of those particular facts of life. N o r can 
it be a matter of learning specific patterns of behaviour, for 
Money claims that, i n spite of the immutabi l i ty of gender 
identity, " A sufficiently strong st imulus—physical , hor-
monal , neural, or social—can push you over practically 
any behaviour l ine or barrier" (Money and Tucker , p . 73). 
T h e hypothesis seems mysterious, unless one assumes that 
it is k n o w n a priori that there is such a th ing as the essence 
of each sex, and whi le essential characters are frequently 
tied to this or that more or less accidental ones, only the 
essence is immutable . T h e immutable essence continues to 
elude us. 
Consider menstruation. T h i s is often taken to be a para-
d i g m of objective biological fact, partially def init ional of 
w o m a n h o o d . Is menstruation, at least, an unalterable fact 
of female biology? It is not. K u n g women do not have 
what is considered i n Western women part of a female's 
destiny: a m o n t h l y menstrual cycle. In fact, some women 
might menstruate scarcely a dozen times i n their lives. T h e 
cycles are apparently regulated by a combinat ion of lacta-
t ion patterns, nutr i t ion , and other socially condit ioned 
factors, w h i c h result i n an average of several years without 
menstruating between pregnancies (Short, 1984). 
Closer to home, we know athletes who are able to cease 
menstruating at w i l l for as many months as they please 
s imply by stepping u p their training to suitable thresholds 
w h i c h alter their body-fat ratios to the extent necessary. 
Where then is the inevitable destiny i n the natural fact of 
menstruation? 
Other studies have attempted to document invariant sex 
differences i n strength, sweat production, size, perfor-
mance, musculature, bone growth, height, hormone pro-
duct ion , brain size, ration of brain surface to body surface, 
mathematical and visual-spatial ability, brain lateraliza-
t ion, and levels of testosterone. Seemingly purely natural, 
each of these areas has been shown to vary and be corrupt-
ible by shi f t ing cultural conditions (see L o w e , 1983; Fee, 
1983). 
Nevertheless, the search continues. Why? Perhaps the 
systematic elusiveness of that immutable gender essence 
strongly suggests that i n the last analysis it is l ike other 
essences, an entity that only patriarchal (or matriarchal) 
faith sustains. 
Gender essentialism is a pervasive feature of theoretical 
as wel l as of ordinary discourse. Essentialism of any k i n d , 
as a p p l i e d to the bio logica l level or higher, is a dubious 
dogma (de Sousa, 1984). It is particularly pernicious i n the 
field of sex. T h e search for sex differences is, i n important 
ways, a search for the natural man. We use the phrase 
advisedly, for it is part of the mythology of gender sex that 
women have been viewed as nature to men's culture. For 
this reason, we conclude by suggesting a normative defini-
t ion of feminism: 
F e m i n i s m is the rejection of the modern attack o n 
essentialism, appl ied to both gender sex and erotic 
sex. T h e anti-essentialism of feminist phi losophy 
challenges not only the specific ways that women 
and men are dist inguished; it challenges the distinc-
t ion itself. 
N O T E S 
1. Since this paper was written, a large and strongly anti-feminist book 
(Scruton, 1986) has appeared. Our reaction to that book is forthcom-
ing in The Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 
2. The biology of sex poses three problems, (i) There is nothing 
biologically necessary about the existence of exactly two sexes for 
reproduction. Many species have no sexes at all, reproducing either 
by mitosis, or by some form of parthenogenesis (for example, see 
Cole, 1984). It is one of the great unresolved questions of evolution-
ary biology how the manifest disadvantages of meiosis—the effec-
tive halving of each gene's chances of transmission at every 
generation—can be outweighed by the advantages of sex (see Willi-
ams, 1972; Maranto and Brownlee, 1984). (ii) Even given the fact of 
reproduction by genetic recombination, how do the gametes come to 
be dimorphic—with a big one, identified by conventional definition 
as the female, and a little one, conventionally defined as the male? 
(iii) The dimorphism of phenotypes or grown up individuals is 
again a completely different question. A l l three questions are inde-
pendent of problems posed by any further differences between the 
sexes. 
3. Here feminism owes some debt to Marxism, and especially the 
Marxist concept of false consciousness, which makes it possible to 
view what are phenomenologically private and individual choices 
as constrained by material historical factors. Marxists have not 
generally included reproduction under the general heading of pro-
duction. Nor have they had much to say about heterosexism, its 
meaning, and its consequences. O n heterosexism, see Rich, 1980. 
O n the politics of reproduction, see O'Brien, 1981; and Clark and 
Lange, 1979. 
4. Onestrikingexception,asDaleSpender(1980,p. 180, expanding on 
a point made by Muriel Schultz) has point out, is the word for rape: 
why is it, or some synonym (or it, not obscene? It is a troubling 
paradox that a sexual word, "fuck," is used in slang to denote a 
hateful aggressive act, but the word for sexual aggression remains 
emotionally neutral. 
5. Baker (1984) discusses these first three categories. Our student, Ms. 
Loretta Castellarin has explored a fourth category, noting that 
where males are referred to in edible terms (e.g., "hunk of beef"), 
they are seen as the main course, whereas women are in the dessert or 
snack category. 
6. Remarkably, Plato—unlike Aristotle, Aquinas, or D . H . Lawrence-
did not make this assumption. No doubt, Plato was helped in this 
bit of conceptual liberation by being homosexual. 
7. See, for example, Barry, 1979; de Beauvoir, 1952, especially the 
chapter "The Woman in Love"; Firestone, 1970; Koedt, 1973; and 
Morgan, 1986. 
8. This is the biological term for a pair of organs that develop out of the 
same original structures. The function of homologous organs may 
or may not be identical; but, organs that do not stem from identical 
origins and have similar function are said to be "analogous." 
9. Gender essentialism is not confined to patriarchal thinking. For a 
recent example of feminist gender essentialism, see Dworkin, 1987, 
as well as the work of many French feminist theorists. 
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The Transition Years 
Surviv ing the years, w a l k i n g through the days, 
Dry and brittle, th in- l ipped and Machiavel l ian. 
Cracked dreams and oiled eyes, 
Victor ian lace and Canadiana pine, 
Power driven and passion drowned. 
A t night she dreamed. 
Keeper of microwave children, 
Electronic tones l u l l i n g her immortal i ty to sleep. 
Piaget has caged her babies, 
Pioneer of h i g h tech wilderness: 
T r i b a l drums revisited. 
They said she was like fire and ice. 
Those were the kinder ones. 
Others called her barren, unnatural and ambitious. 
In fact she was ordinary, only different. 
One night she expectedly died. 
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